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DOING THINGS 
WITH ACTS
James Robert Wood
Actions and Objects from Hobbes 
to Richardson by Jonathan 
Kramnick. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2010, 
Pp. 307. $65 cloth, $24.95 paper, 
$24.95 e-book.
Jonathan Kramnick’s absorbing 
new book explores how philoso-
phers, poets, and writers of fic-
tion grappled with the conceptual 
problems surrounding the nature 
of human action between roughly 
1650 and 1750. Kramnick presents 
action as an interface between the 
world and the mind. In a typically 
aphoristic phrase, he observes early 
on in the book that “Actions extend 
mind into the world” (3, his em-
phasis). A commonsense account 
of action might be to say that ac-
tions occur when people decide to 
do something and then perform 
physical motions that cause things 
to happen in the world. Kramnick, 
however, is especially interested in 
writers who investigated the pos-
sible reversibility of this sequence, 
thus bringing “the world into the 
mind” (5). Against standard nar-
ratives of deepening interiority, 
Kramnick shows how writers 
from Thomas Hobbes to Samuel 
Richardson emphasized the role of 
external causes in the shaping of in-
tentional acts.
Kramnick’s book is exemplary 
for the clarity with which it divides 
up the spectrum of philosophical po-
sitions on human action. Probably 
the most important crux for Kram-
nick’s authors was the problem of 
defining the difference between 
intentional acts and physical events. 
This difference is nicely illustrated 
in the beginning pages through the 
contrast between the historic ap-
pearance of Halley’s Comet in 1682 
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and the cutting of Belinda’s hair in 
Alexander Pope’s The Rape of the 
Lock (1714). Asking why the Baron 
cut Belinda’s hair involves issues of 
intention that are irrelevant when 
we ask why the comet returned to 
the skies. The distinction between 
intended actions and physical events 
might seem simple on the face of it. 
But describing and accounting for 
this difference turns out to be ex-
ceptionally difficult.
The problem of action is bound 
up with the problem of conscious-
ness: the puzzle of explaining how it 
is that some clumps of matter seem 
to possess consciousness whereas 
others do not. Kramnick is espe-
cially interested in the counterintui-
tive conclusions to which thinkers 
were sometimes driven by their ef-
forts to explain consciousness and 
its connection to intentional actions. 
At one extreme was the position 
that consciousness is an illusion and 
nothing and no one really has it. 
The other extreme was the position 
that everything in nature possesses 
at least some consciousness. In both 
cases, the distinction between the 
things that people do and the things 
that things do disappears. Many 
writers, however, found themselves 
somewhere along the continuum 
between the two extremes, often 
reaching the compromise position 
that consciousness is a property that 
emerges from particles that are not 
themselves conscious.
The upshot was that the ac-
tions of conscious agents could not 
be easily disentangled from the 
nonconscious world that enfolded 
them. The idea that the Baron’s 
decision to cut Belinda’s hair might 
not be so different in nature from 
the return of Halley’s Comet had 
to be taken seriously. Pope him-
self points to the possibility that 
the “am’rous Causes” operating on 
the Baron may be just as irresistible 
as the gravitational forces operat-
ing on Halley’s Comet. Kramnick 
shows how writers tried to account 
at once for the mind-bound nature 
of intentional actions and also for 
their implication in a causal net-
work that extends outside the mind 
into the world beyond the self.
Kramnick’s method is to focus on 
a series of cases in which a problem 
about the nature of action emerges 
in a text or in the space between 
texts. He begins with the debate 
on free will between Hobbes and 
John Bramhall in which Hobbes 
contended that the will behind 
any human action can be traced 
to antecedent causes in the world, 
whereas Bramhall argued that the 
will is formed independently of 
these causes. Kramnick then turns 
to the problem of consciousness by 
way of the dueling translations 
of Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura 
by Thomas Creech (in 1682) and 
John Wilmot, the second earl of 
Rochester. Kramnick suggests 
that Creech’s and Rochester’s 
translations are influenced by the 
translators’ differing ideas about 
the existence of consciousness. 
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Whereas Creech’s Lucretius shows 
consciousness emerging from in-
sensate particles, Rochester tends to 
put Lucretius into reverse, having 
consciousness dissolve back into the 
particles from which it emerged. 
Kramnick turns over the next chap-
ter entirely to Rochester’s poetry, 
reading his philosophical and sex-
ual verse as attempting “alternately 
to fit mental states to actions after 
they have already happened or to 
get rid of both entirely” (140). The 
following chapter on John Locke 
returns to Kramnick’s overarching 
concern with how positions on ac-
tion are worked out in conflict and 
conversation with others, tracking 
how Locke revised his ideas on ac-
tion in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690) following his 
discussions with Irish philosopher 
William Molyneaux.
The last two chapters turn from 
poetry and philosophy to prose fic-
tion. Kramnick reads Eliza Hay-
wood’s Love in Excess (1719–20) and 
Fantomina (1725) as fictions about 
the problem of determining the 
presence of consent in intimate re-
lationships. Both of these amatory 
fictions stage sexual encounters be-
tween men and women where the 
woman’s conscious consent seems 
ambiguous, at best. Kramnick’s ar-
gument is that the style and narra-
tive techniques of Haywood’s early 
novels develop a picture of consent 
that is in many respects comparable 
to Locke’s account of tacit consent 
in the Two Treatises of Government 
(1690). For Locke, the consent of 
the governed is not located pri-
marily in the conscious intentions 
of individuals but rather inferred 
through their participation in civil 
society. Likewise in early Hay-
wood, according to Kramnick, 
consent does not inhere in the mind 
but “hovers in the world or on one’s 
skin or between bodies or over dif-
ferent slices of time” (193).
The last chapter will play a key 
role in the ongoing critical debate 
on Richardson’s Clarissa (1748). 
Whereas William Warner and 
Terry Castle have read the conflict 
between Clarissa and Lovelace as 
a struggle between two mutually 
incompatible accounts of inter-
pretation, Kramnick understands 
their contention as one between 
two mutually incompatible ac-
counts of action. Clarissa holds 
that the will to perform an action 
is formed independently of exter-
nal circumstances. To the charge of 
doing terrible things—for example 
running away with Lovelace, hav-
ing sex with him, and, in the end, 
willing herself to die—she charac-
teristically replies that she has not 
acted in any of these cases since she 
formed no intention to do any of 
these things. Whereas Clarissa be-
lieves that an action without an in-
tention is no action at all, Lovelace 
treats actions as primary and inten-
tions as immanent within them. 
Kramnick thus reads Lovelace’s 
machinations throughout the novel 
as “attempts to arrange Clarissa’s 
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environment to make it appear as 
if she has consented, or, what is the 
same, to make it so she has already 
consented” (216, his emphasis). The 
chapter ends with a reconsidera-
tion of the conundrum of whether 
Clarissa commits suicide, in which 
Kramnick does not so much supply 
an answer as show how the answer 
depends on the implicit theory of 
action that the reader brings to the 
book.
Kramnick’s book invites com-
parisons to Sandra Macpherson’s 
Harm’s Way: Tragic Responsibility 
and the Novel Form (2010). These 
books share certain concerns and 
deal with essentially the same pe-
riod of English literature. Both 
Kramnick and Macpherson are 
impatient with what Macpherson 
dubs the “interiority thesis”: the 
story that has literature taking a 
turn inward into the self over the 
long eighteenth century. They are, 
however, quite dissimilar in their 
argumentative strategies. Whereas 
Kramnick’s argument draws on 
the philosophy of action, Macpher-
son’s is based on the legal con-
cept of strict liability, which made 
perpetrators punishable for their 
harmful actions regardless of their 
intentions. Her argument, pursued 
with an attorney’s tenacity, is that 
strict liability underlies the sense of 
justice within the novel as a genre.
Kramnick’s argument against 
the interiority thesis does not rest 
on establishing the irrelevance 
of intention and therefore the 
unimportance or nonexistence of 
interiority. Rather, he questions the 
assumption that intention and inte-
riority necessarily go together. He 
shows that even mental states like 
consent and intent, which we might 
imagine as subsisting securely 
within the mind, were frequently 
understood in the period as hav-
ing an existence outside the head. 
Kramnick takes care to note that 
the externalist reading of intentions 
was always in dialogue with a con-
trary understanding of intentions as 
formed by the self independently of 
outward circumstances. Whereas 
Macpherson holds that the novel 
offers essentially one answer on the 
question of action, defining recalci-
trant writers like Henry Fielding 
as outliers, Kramnick makes no 
such claims for the univocality of 
any particular genre or the period 
that he studies. He emphasizes in-
stead the differences between au-
thors, between rival translations 
of a work, between successive edi-
tions of a text, and between the 
opinions of literary characters. If 
Macpherson is like an attorney in 
an adversarial system, Kramnick 
is more like a judge summing up 
the main arguments before the jury 
retires. Macpherson’s drive to make 
her novels fit one description of ac-
tion sometimes (for this reviewer) 
results in a certain stretching of in-
terpretation. But Kramnick’s very 
openness to the internal debates 
of texts seems to result in its own 
kind of stretching in the chapter 
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on Clarissa. After all, Richardson’s 
text refuses to allow readers to hold 
Clarissa’s and Lovelace’s positions 
in suspension. Indeed, Richardson 
seems to have done everything he 
could with the editorial commen-
tary appended to successive editions 
of the novel to persuade readers to 
take Clarissa’s outlook on action 
over Lovelace’s, even if successive 
readers have found Lovelace’s lib-
ertine position seductive.
In keeping with Kramnick’s 
general concern for opening up 
problems rather than resolving 
them, his book ends not with a 
conclusion but a question: “Has 
anything happened? If so, who or 
what is its cause?” (230). This final 
question will disappoint readers 
searching for a single takeaway 
thesis from Kramnick’s book. It is, 
however, precisely because Kram-
nick’s book is less thesis driven than 
Macpherson’s that it can afford to 
be more ecumenical in its consid-
eration of the diverse approaches to 
the problem of how minds fit into 
the world. Kramnick allows space 
for his writers (and his readers) to 
think. He frequently takes the indi-
vidual sentence as his primary unit 
of analysis, showing how writers 
define the relation between actions 
and agents through syntax and 
style. In Locke’s revised version of 
his chapter on action, for example, 
“the prose takes a dilatory form 
uncharacteristic of the first edi-
tion: each sentence wrangles into a 
multiple devolution of subordinate 
clauses” (156). In Haywood’s prose, 
“states of mind seem almost to 
overflow the sentence, in marked 
excess of the pronoun to which they 
belong. The effect is that the gram-
matical subject of the clause seems 
to traipse after her own mind” 
(184). As these examples show, 
Kramnick’s couches his acute ob-
servations on prose style in a lively 
and luminous style of his own.
The close attention to the spe-
cific workings of sentences in Ac-
tions and Objects—both Kramnick’s 
own and those of his writers—fits 
a book that deliberately turns away 
from grand literary-historical nar-
rative in favor of a focus on the 
singularities of the individual au-
thor and the individual text. The 
book does offer a loose historical 
trajectory, which moves from “a 
new attention to actions amid dy-
nastic anxieties and civil war to a 
concern with minds and behavior 
amid polite and commercial ex-
change” (12). But Kramnick tells 
us at the outset that his book will 
tell no linear story about how ideas 
about action changed over time: 
“My goal has not been to follow 
a single perspective as it grows to 
dominance, however, but rather 
to examine competing models of 
mind and action across the period 
and into ours” (viii). Kramnick’s re-
fusal to impose a grand récit on his 
materials enables him to avoid the 
perils of teleology. But Actions and 
Objects sometimes made me wish 
for the kind of large-scale “plot” 
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that undergirded Kramnick’s pre-
vious book, Making the English 
Canon (1999). The absence of such 
a plot is not a bad thing in itself 
(why should we expect ideas about 
action to develop in one direction 
over time?), but some overarch-
ing issues are raised by Kramnick’s 
book that ask to be worked out 
on a larger historical canvas. The 
question of sexuality, for example, 
arises again and again in the book, 
probably because it is in this area in 
particular that a simple dualistic ac-
count of the mind’s relation to the 
body threatens to break down. One 
of the avenues for research that 
Kramnick’s book opens up, then, 
is a wider rethinking of the history 
of sexuality through the problem of 
human action.
Like the best literary criticism, 
Kramnick’s work forces us to recon-
sider the fundamental assumptions 
that we bring to texts. The reader 
emerges from Actions and Objects 
with a new sense of the foreignness 
with which  seventeenth- and 
 eighteenth-century writers con-
ceived of the links or lack thereof 
among persons, intentions, and ac-
tions. His readings succeed in raising 
a set of important questions about 
the ontology of actions that have 
either gone unasked or have been 
subsumed under the problematic of 
interpretation. The last two chap-
ters on Haywood and Richardson in 
particular challenge the grounds on 
which those authors have been read. 
Kramnick’s book invites its readers to 
rethink some of the basic stories that 
critics tell their students and them-
selves about literary history. Actions 
and Objects will be a key guide for 
critics searching for alternatives to 
narratives of rising interiority as they 
try to make sense of what happened 
to English literature and thought be-
tween Rochester and Richardson.
James Robert Wood teaches in the Department 
of English at Trinity College Dublin. He is 
working on a book entitled “Enlightenment 
Anecdotes.”
